The Ascension: Evidence Against the Resurrection

I have concluded… that the Ascension represents my greatest struggle of faith – not whether it happened, but why. It challenges me more than the problem of pain, more than the difficulty of harmonizing science and the Bible, more than belief in the Resurrection and other miracles. It seems odd to admit such a notion – I have never read a book or article conceived to answer doubts about the Ascension – yet for me what has happened since Jesus’ departure strikes at the core of my faith. Would it not have been better if the Ascension had never happened? If Jesus had stayed on earth, he could answer our questions, solve our doubts, mediate our disputes of doctrine and policy.

Philip Yancey, The Jesus I Never Knew (1995), 229.

The primary story of the ascension is recorded in Acts 1, after the Jesus’ resurrection and 40 days of personal appearances. “He was lifted up while they were looking on, and a cloud received Him out of their sight. And as they were gazing intently into the sky while He was going, behold, two men in white clothing stood beside them. They also said, “Men of Galilee, why do you stand looking into the sky? This Jesus, who has been taken up from you into heaven, will come in just the same way as you have watched Him go into heaven.” (Acts 1.9-11)

It is my contention that the story of the Ascension counts as historical evidence against the resurrection. Like Yancey, I am troubled by several issues related to the ascension. They pose a serious problem for building a historical case for the resurrection. Please keep in mind that I write this as a Christian who believes in the resurrection. Because I love the truth, I cannot simply shrug off difficult issues. Here is why I believe the story of the ascension counts as evidence against the historical case for the resurrection of Jesus.

There is one uncontested fact about the current state of Jesus: Jesus has not been seen publicly since the first century. Some individuals have seen him in visions. Some have claimed to have traveled to heaven and seen him there. Perhaps some even claim that he visited them on earth in the flesh. Even if we grant the veracity of all these experiences, it is clear that he is no longer a public figure. In considering the historical case for the resurrection, we must answer the question of where Jesus is now. There seem to be four possible answers:

1. Jesus rose bodily from the dead and ascended into heaven, according to Luke and Acts.
2. Jesus did not rise from the dead, and his body rotted away.
3. Jesus rose from the dead, and he is alive and well on planet Earth, living in obscurity.
4. Jesus rose from the dead, died a second time, and his body rotted away.

I am not aware of anyone who has seriously argued for the third or fourth options. As a living individual (option three), he would have less relevance than Elvis, who at least gets his picture on tabloids. If he died a second death (option four), his resurrection was practically irrelevant. Certainly Jesus would have no theological significance. The only plausible options, I believe, are the first two. Which option best explains the facts?


In Reasonable Faith (pp.295-8, also referred to in his debate with Gerd Lüdemann), William Lane Craig proposes C.B. McCullogh’s seven tests as a standard for accepting a historical hypothesis.

1. The hypothesis, together with other true statements, must imply further statements describing present, observable data.


2. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory scope than rival hypotheses.


3. They hypothesis must have greater explanatory scope than rival hypotheses.


4. The hypothesis must be more plausible than rival hypotheses.


5. The hypothesis must be less ad hoc than rival hypotheses.


6. The hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs than rival hypotheses.


7. The hypothesis must so exceed its rivals in fulfilling conditions (2)-(6) that there is little chance of a rival hypothesis exceeding it in meeting these conditions.

Craig argues that the resurrection hypothesis meets all seven of these criteria. My contention is that the Ascension hypothesis (which the Resurrection hypothesis seems to entail) fails at least four of these tests.

2. It lacks in explanatory scope. As Lüdemann suggested (Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?, 155) it does not explain the contradiction between the ascension in Acts 1 and that of Luke 24, where the times and locations of the ascension differ from one another. It does not explain why other biblical writers do not record an ascension. If the Lukan writings were removed from the canon, the issue of what happened to Jesus after the resurrection would almost certainly be a hot topic in Christian theology. There are hints that Jesus is in heaven in John and the epistles, but we are still left with (the original version of) Mark and Matthew. When read in their own context (rather than Luke's), Jesus’ final words in Matthew 28.20 seem to have a very different meaning: “And lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the age.”

3. It lacks in explanatory power. The best apologetic for Jesus’ resurrection would be public appearances. Imagine if we could hear the resurrection story for the first time. “Wow,” we might say, “you’ve made a very strong case that Jesus rose from the dead. I would very much like to meet him. I have all sorts of questions about what it would be like to be dead for three days.” The essence of Craig's response? “Well, um, you, ahh… can’t. Yeah, that’s the ticket. See, he, ah, he went to heaven. Yeah, that’s it. He went to heaven and now no one can see him. You just have to take my word for it. Look, didn’t I present compelling evidence.” This explanation does not seem compelling.

4 & 5. It is either not plausible or it is ad hoc. Craig has spent a great deal of time and energy arguing for a physical resurrection. Therefore the ascension must be a physical ascension. If Jesus actually came out of the tomb, then he actually flew up into space. But if so, did he go to the moon? … to Mars? … to another galaxy? A modern view of the cosmos creates certain problems for belief in a physical ascension. Roy Hoover posits that,

the idea of the resurrection is… dependant on a certain view of the cosmos, namely that the cosmos has a three-level structure: the earth is the middle part; above the earth is heaven or the heavens, the space occupied by God and the angels; below the earth is Hades, the realm of death and the powers of evil. ("The Contest Between Orthodoxy and Veracity" in Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?, 141)

In the same volume, Steven Davis responds to the three-story-universe view by declaring that it is a metaphor, not a cosmology. (79) “The ascension of Jesus was primarily a change of state rather than a change of location, but it was visibly symbolized for the disciples by a change of location.” (80) But there is no indication in the text that Luke believed, or expected his readers to believe, that Jesus’ ascension was anything other than a literal ascension. Bringing modern science to bear on the story is a matter of eisegesis (reading into the text something that is not there) rather than exegesis (letting the text speak for itself). This view may be properly accused of being ad hoc and contrived.

6. It is not in accord with accepted beliefs. It is not our experience that anyone can ascend to heaven. If the ascension story was told about another historical figure, would Craig be inclined to accept it? I doubt it because, in McCullough’s language, such a story is not in accord with accepted beliefs.

7. It may or may not outstrip any of its rival theories in meeting conditions (2)-(6). Those who do not accept the ascension must explain the rise of the early church, which was based on their belief in the resurrection, which was in turn based on (a)finding Jesus' tomb empty, and (b)Jesus' resurrection appearances. But there are a lot of events in history (especially antiquity) for which we do not have good explanations. The resurrection/ascension hypothesis perhaps outstrips its rivals, but given the difficulties associated with the ascension, they all frankly seem like conjecture. There are some historical questions which we must answer by saying that we simply don't know.

It is my contention that the Ascension hypothesis fails tests (2); (3); either (4) or (5); and (6). In light of this, the case for the Resurrection is not as strong as Craig and others would like us to think. At best, we may say that, although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, the Resurrection seems to be the best hypothesis. It is disturbing, to say the least, to build my faith on a relatively uncertain hypothesis for describing somewhat ambiguous evidence. If this is not fideism, I don't know what is.

I would accept the historical hypothesis in an overall cumulative case for Jesus' resurrection, but I do not know what other lines of reasoning to pursue. I assert that we are justified (we are within our epistemic rights) in either believing or disbelieving in the resurrection of Jesus. But this is the beginning of the road to religious relativism and normative pluralism, which seems absolutely contrary to Christian orthodoxy. Thus I can no longer feel totally comfortable with evangelical theology unless I can (a)find arguments that make the Ascension more plausible, or (b)buttress the case for the resurrection with different kinds of arguments than Craig and others present.

The Craig/Lüdemann Resurrection Debate

Last week I asked the question of whether belief in the resurrection of Jesus is justified and referenced the book, Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?, edited by Kreeft and Tacelli. Here are my thoughts on that book.

The core portion of the book is the transcript of a 1997 debate at Boston College between William Lane Craig, a Christian philosopher and apologist, and Gerd Lüdemann, a German New Testament scholar. Tom Wright has also debated Lüdemann on this subject (though I have not been able to find a transcript), which added to my anticipation of the book. The book is comprised of four responses to the debate, two siding with each opponent, followed by response essays by both Lüdemann and Craig.

I expected to find strong arguments from both debaters, since each is highly respected in his respective field. I hoped to be challenged on some points, and be forced to think through the relevant issues related to the resurrection. I anticipated a straightforward and objective book.
Unfortunately, I was disappointed with the actual content of the book. Beginning with the debate portion itself, it seemed that Craig was clearly the better debater. In his opening statement, Craig laid out his argument and then critiqued Lüdemann’s position before it had even been given. This one-two attack and counter-attack seemed to throw Lüdemann mentally off balance. In a total spirit of confusion, Lüdemann tried to alter his opening statement on the fly to be more responsive to Craig. Perhaps he figured that he was already going to address the issues, so why not rearrange them to correspond with Craig’s four “facts”, critiquing Craig’s argument while laying out his own. Unfortunately, he succeeded in neither. This made for an awkward rebuttal for Craig, who had been given no real opposing position to respond to.

I personally felt that the debate gave a good show of Craig’s debating prowess, and left little room for the facts to do their own job. In short, I felt cheated. It could have been a much more satisfying debate for everyone had Lüdemann spoken first instead of Craig, which would allowed us to hear his original opening statement in full. Alternately, Lüdemann could have been given time for his first rebuttal before his opening statement.

In the book as a whole, the editing favored the Christian position in several ways. First is the imbalance between philosophy and New Testament scholarship. Craig, a philosopher, had his argument strengthened by Gundry, a New Testament scholar. Lüdemann had no similar support on the philosophical side. Second, the editors chose a debate that had already been conducted. They already knew that Lüdemann had faired poorly. Third, the editors framed the book at the start with an introduction that emphasizes the Christian implications of the debate. I’m not sure that a non-Christian would be in agreement with Copan and Tacelli about the importance of the issue. (It is primarily Christians that are interested in these sorts of debates, as demonstrated by a brief glance at reviews of this book on amazon.com.) Finally, the book was framed at the end with Craig’s essay rather than Lüdemann’s, even though a strictly objective arrangement would likely follow their order in the debate.

This book can establish a grid for later reading on the resurrection. However, parts of the grid, especially the non-evangelical perspective, will need to be supplemented with more substantial books. A stronger case can be made against the resurrection than this book presents, so we should not be led to think that Lüdemann has given us the best that a skeptic has to give. Lüdemann’s concluding suggestion for a “new language of interpretation” (158) is particularly troubling. Looking to the gnostics for his inspiration, he states that “one’s stability is not assured by trust in the creator but rather is threatened by it… [T]he Gnostic idea of the unwavering race opens up an area of stability, steadfastness and depth – in short a ground on which I can stand in the struggle and mystery of life into which all of us have been thrown.” (161) He is not far from Anton LeVey’s vision for humanity as presented in The Satanic Bible. This sort of spirituality is blasphemous to the theist, bizarre to the naturalist, and unlikely to win either.

Is Belief in Jesus' Resurrection Justified?

May I suggest that, fundamentally, the way we know Christianity to be true
is by the self-authenticating witness of God's Holy Spirit? Now what do I
mean by that? I mean that the experience of the Holy Spirit is veridical and unmistakable (though not necessarily irresistible or indubitable) for him
who has it; that such a person does not need supplementary arguments or
evidence in order to know and to know with confidence that he is in fact
experiencing the Spirit of God... How then does the believer know that
Christianity is true? He knows because of the self-authenticating witness of
God's Spirit who lives within him.

- William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, 32-4

What bothers me about Bill Craig (pictured here with two people I have never met) is that he is so absolutely overconfident that he is right. There are very few self-authenticating experiences in life - experiences that you can be so sure of that there is no way that you could possibly be wrong. Decartes' famous statement, "cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) seems to be self-authenticating; statements of feeling are self-authenticating, like, "I feel hungry." The fact that you feel it is proof that you feel it. But outside of a few examples, no experience is ever self-authenticating. There is always some room for doubt - maybe you misinterpreted, or don't have all the information, or have been deceived or something.

If you allow this line of reasoning, then you have to allow the legitimacy of Mormonism. They tell you to pray about the book of Mormon and God will confirm to you that it is true. They have this same sort of confidence that their religious experience is self-authenticating. It just doesn't hold up. I'm not saying anything here that Craig himself is not aware of, so I'm really not sure why he advances this argument.

But the place where this reasoning really bothers me is in his defense of the resurrection. There has probably not been anything that has shaken my faith so much as reading Bill Craig's defense of the resurrection. Take, for instance, his argument with Gerd Lüdemann in Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?. Craig acts as if he has an absolutely rock solid case for the resurrection and that you couldn't possibly doubt it so long as you have all the historical evidence. Lüdemann, who has no philosophical training, is a really lousy debate partner and presents a confused and weak argument. There are gaping holes in Craig's argument, but you'd never know it from Lüdemann's presentation.

I will leave the holes in Craig's argument for another post. What really bothered me was how he came back to this idea of self-authentication in his concluding statement. He was smart enough to save this point to the very end, because it does not count as real evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. And yet the real reason Craig believes in the resurrection is not the historical evidence. "So if you ask me why I believe Christ is risen from the dead, I would not only point to the historical evidence, but I would reply in the words of the old hymn, 'You ask me how I know he lives? He lives within my heart!'" (p.65)

The orthodox Christian faith rests, at least in part, on a defense of the resurrection. But the evidence to compel someone to believe in the resurrection is not that good. Say, for instance, that we had the same historical evidence for the resurrection of Abraham Lincoln. Would he be inclined to argue that Lincoln too had risen from the dead? I doubt it. The real reason Craig feels the evidence is so good is because it is confirmed by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. But the inner witness of the Holy Spirit cannot function as valid evidence any more than it can function as valid evidence for the veracity of the book of Mormon.

I still believe in Jesus' resurrection. I believe for the same reason that Craig does: He lives within my heart. But I don't think I have sufficient epistemological justification for that belief. Moreover, I am skeptical that any historical argument will really be satisfactory (not even N.T. Wright's, with all his scholastic superpowers). When the early Christians first proclaimed Jesus' resurrection, they were not advancing historical arguments. It seems I am searching for a different line of reasoning that is more in line with theirs.

So I think we are within our epistemic rights to believe in Jesus' resurrection. That is to say, if we accept the resurrection on fideistic grounds, we can come up with rational arguments to justify the fideistic jump we have already made. But the belief still ultimately rests on fideism. I think this is what I was getting at a few weeks ago with my Theology is not Knowledge post. Theology cannot be truly public because it rests on this fideistic assumption that Jesus rose from the dead.

You may not agree with me that Bill Craig's (or Tom Wright's) historical arguments are not compelling. I hope to revisit that issue soon. But if you were to accept my premise that the Craig's arguments are not compelling, do you think the rest of what I've said follows?

N.T. Wright Wrecked My Life

Once upon a time the Christian faith made sense to me. There were some things that I did not understand or some things that did not seem to fit perfectly, but overall the whole thing worked pretty well. Then I started reading N.T. Wright and my whole world crashed down around me.

See, I read somewhere that you ought to pick one author and read as much of their writing as you can so that you can interact in depth with their thought. This was well before I started seminary, back when I did not care a whit about scholarship. I decided to read Wright after first encountering him in a "Life of Jesus" class at church. We had read through the little book The Life of Jesus, and even though it was not that impressive I felt Wright had more under the surface than I had been able to garner from this little volume. He seemed to be a highly regarded Jesus scholar, so I wanted to see what all the fuss was about.

So I went to the library at our local Catholic college where I found and checked out his two massive works, The New Testament and the People of God and Jesus and the Victory of God. I also picked up The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions, in which he and co-author, Marcus Borg, defend and critique one another's historical reconstructions of Jesus. I began with The Meaning of Jesus, since it seemed the most accessible of the three, and I started to get hooked. But it was when I moved on to The New Testament and the People of God that everything I believed was shaken.

The problem is that it was not a frontal assault. In fact, I stood behind N.T. Wright as we took the liberal onslaught from Borg in The Meaning of Jesus. But as Wright prepared to deliver an uppercut of historical scholarship to Borg, I moved in to see things more closely and got elbowed in the face. I have spent the past decade trying to recover from that injury.

What is this great injury? Simply this: to understand the New Testament, we must read it in light of the world of first century Judaism, which is a lot more alien to us in the twentieth century than we like to think. It is especially rooted in the apocalyptic genre, especially in Daniel. Specifically, Daniel 7 is a particularly important passage for understanding early Christianity and the message of Jesus: the Son of Man is enthroned beside the Ancient of Days as the Kingdom of God is ushered in.

The book of Daniel represents in a microcosm the locus of most of my theological problems. Was it really written by Daniel or was it actually written centuries later during the Maccabean period? Scholars can make a good case for the latter, which even Wright accepts. Why should we even accept Daniel as scripture? It is not enough to say that we accept it because Jesus accepted it, since this whole examination of Daniel was prompted because it is the linchpin which holds together the New Testament. The book of Daniel (and the Old Testament as a whole) provides the entire foundation for the New Testament. As I see it, if Daniel falls, so does the New Testament.

The book of Daniel presents the primary OT basis for belief in an end-time resurrection of the dead. If it was written just to encourage the faithful that were being martyred by the Hellenistic king Antiochus Epiphanies, then what reason do we have to believe it? Would we not have warrant to judge that it was just wishful thinking? ...that as the Jews looked around at the injustices against their people, they speculated that there must be a resurrection to put things right? Wright himself proposes that this sort of eschatology (God will one day make all things right) arises from the combination of the doctrine of monotheism (God is in control), election (He has chosen Israel), and reality (Israel is suffering). Am I to believe in the resurrection of the dead because there was a pogrom against the Jews over two millennia ago? Please forgive me if this is a bit of a stumbling block in my faith.

Finally, even if I can get past all of this, the message of Daniel looks very different from the gospel I received. The gospel I know says you can be forgiven for your sins if you trust in Jesus, but if you do not, you will be damned for eternity. The message of Daniel is much more intuitive: that even when the bad guys seem to get away with it in this life, they will not in the end; and even if the good guys seem to get screwed in this life, they will ultimately be vindicated. It is a much more 'pluralist-friendly' message than orthodox theology seems to allow.

N.T. Wright does a fine job of making the New Testament seem historically plausible, but only at the expense of making its message seem utterly implausible.

O Dr. Wright, why tormentest thou me?